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In recent years problems about top-executive compensation of listed companies 
have been paid much attention, meanwhile the incentive and constraint relation 
between top-executive compensation and enterprise performance is an important 
research field in modern enterprise theory. After more and more private enterprises 
have entered capital market with the reform of China’s economic structure, enterprise 
expansion and adjustment of shareholder structure result in more complex 
principal-agent problems. Based on the research paradigm of top-executive 
compensation and enterprise performance, the paper studies the influence of 
enterprise governance structure and owner’s controlling rights on top-executive 
compensation with the data of top three executives’ compensation in listed private 
enterprises from 2006 to 2009 and some other data. 
Firstly, the paper reviews some literatures on correlation and determination 
mechanism between top-executive compensation and enterprise performance, 
summaries the basic factors affecting compensation-performance problem, and 
establishes the basic framework of model based on former researchers’ work. Results 
show that business performance and enterprise scale are the two most significant 
factors affecting top-executive compensation for private enterprises. Then dummy 
variables are established to discuss the incentive and constraint effect of enterprise 
governance structure and owner’s controlling rights on top-executive compensation. 
According to the results, some conclusions are found: 1. Favorable governance 
structure of the board has more incentive effect than its constraint effect on 
top-executive compensation and Stewardship Theory can be used to partly explain 
problems of listed private enterprises with some practical significance. 2. 
top-executive compensation of “Reorganized Private enterprise” (a private enterprise 
which are reorganized from a state-owned enterprise after listing) is relatively lower, 
and its incentive is weaker than that of “Original Private Enterprise”. 3. A private 
















higher top-executive compensation, but can’t avoid high agency cost due to controller 
vacancy. 4. If a listed private enterprise is controlled by pyramid structure, its senior 
officials have more motivation and opportunity to abuse their power and get excess 
earnings, since relatively dispersed and complex structure weaken controller’s 
supervision on executives. 
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性。截至 2010 年 3 月，第一、在中证指数系列产品中，有一个不为大众所熟知
的产品，叫做中证民营 200 指数，该指数在过去五年中的走势，远远高于上证指
数、沪深 300 等指数；第二，民企市值在 A 股总市值中虽然仅占 15%，但近 5 年













































































容的结构框架如图 1-1 所示： 
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